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Abstract 
This paper proposes a model to assess train passing a red signal without authorization, a SPAD. The 
approach is based on Big Data techniques so that many types of data may be integrated, or even added 
at a later date, to get a richer view of these complicated events. The proposed approach integrates 
multiple data sources using a graph database. A four-steps data modeling approach for safety data 
model is introduced. The steps are problem formulation, identification of data points, identification 
of relations and calculation of the safety indicators. A graph database was used to store, manage and 
query the data, whereas R software was used to automate the data upload and post-process the 
results. A case study demonstrates how indicators have extracted that warning in the case that the 
SPAD safety envelope is reduced. The technique is demonstrated with a case study that focuses on 
the detection of SPADs and safety distances for SPADs. The latter provides indicators for to assess the 
severity of near-SPAD incidents.  
 
 Introduction 
Railway systems create an incredible amount of data that potentially hold safety learning if it can be 
tapped into. The GB railways are exploring several ways to unlock safety learning (Network Rail, 2014; 
RSSB, 2016). These efforts benefit from the development of new technologies to deal with such data. 
This paper focuses on using graph databases which, are particularly useful for safety analysis and 
management with big data sources (Hoffer et al., 2016; Sadalage and Fowler, 2013). A key feature is 
that various data sources can be stored alongside one another in the same database to create a more 
detailed understanding of safety than is possible by considering each source separately. This bypasses 
the need for computationally expensive join operations for traditional SQL (Structured Query 
Language) data tables (Miller, 2013). 
This paper introduces methods to combine railway data sources in scalable graph databases to 
improve the understanding of the underlying factors of signals passed at danger (SPAD). The approach 
focuses on recognizing SPAD-related safety occurrences in large amounts of data that were, initially, 
not designed to detect SPADs. The approach provides a means to detect near-miss aspects of SPAD 
risk that have not previously been understood which potentially feed into driver behavior 
management. 
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 Background 
2.1 SPADs  
SPADs are events where a train passes a stop signal and proceeds onto a section of track where it does 
not have authority. SPADs can lead to trains colliding with other trains or road vehicles on level 
crossings, derailing, or striking workers and equipment. As such, SPADs present a major safety risk to 
the railway. In Britain, a SPAD at Ladbroke Grove resulted in 31 fatalities in 1999 (Health and Safety 
Executive, 2000; Lawton and Ward, 2005; Stanton and Walker, 2011). Since then, considerable efforts 
have been made by the rail industry to reduce the number of SPADs.  
With the systems currently used on the railway, understanding of the underlying causes of SPADs 
comes largely from analysis by safety experts after a SPAD has occurred. Analysis reports, such as Rail 
Accident Investigation Branch (2016a; 16b) provide examples of such analyses and provide 
recommendations to prevent recurrence of similar incidents. Whilst such a retrospective approach is 
clearly meaningful, it is an aspiration of railway safety staff to be able to identify the causes of 
accidents prior to the accident occurring. 
Nikandros and Tombs (2007) addressed the issue by taking a data-centric approach that takes input 
from the train control systems and allows SPADs to be normalized by the number of times trains 
approach stop signals. This approach allows not only an understanding of the number of SPADs that 
have occurred but also the number of times train drivers successfully stop the train before a stop 
signal. Zhao et al. (2016) extended this approach by analyzing several years’ worth of Train Describer 
(TD) data that was downloaded from the TD-live data stream provided by Network Rail. This was a 
step towards big-data techniques since it consists of almost two billion records in a single year.  
The approach by Nikandros and Tombs (2007) and Zhao et al. (2016) provides useful insights but 
additional data sources could enrich the insights further. Green et al. (2011) described a method of 
using data collected from the On Train Data Recording (OTDR) equipment to assess driver 
performance. Since driver performance is a significant contributor to SPADs (Dhillon, 2007); a number 
of studies, for example, Naweed (2013), Gibson et al. (2007), Kyriakidis et al. (2015) and Wright et al. 
(2007) sought to identify the factors that influence human behavior that could contribute to SPADs. 
This paper progresses beyond the opportunity to extend the work of Nikandros and Tombs (2007), 
Zhao et al. (2016), Green et al. (2011) and Dhillon (2007). The aim is to create an understanding of 
SPADs not only from the state of the signaling and the number of times trains approach stop signals 
but also from the performance of train drivers on the approach to signals. This paper describes an 
efficient data analysis approach for combining this data but, for reasons of confidentiality, cannot 
present real data.  
2.2 Data management and analysis 
Traditional relational databases (or SQL databases) have proven to be effective for relatively “small” 
amounts of data due to their speed and due to unimpeded data access. The key to SQL success is that 
they use a relational table that remembers where data are stored exactly and which type of data it is. 
The relational table enables ACID (atomicity, consistency, isolation, and durability). However, high 
volume datasets and the complex data structures make SQL databases unwieldy and difficult to write 
queries for (Cudré-Mauroux and Elnikety, 2011). A solution to bypass such problems is to omit the 
relational table by simply storing data in a system that, for lack of a better example, finds its analogy 
in an infinitely scalable library card catalog. In a library catalog, numerous pieces of information are 
stored on cards with label indexes in labeled boxes. Only a very basic index, usually alphabetic, states 
the approximate location of cards but the system does not drill down to each exact card. Retrieving 
that information requires a query for that information and a person and/or search engine to find the 
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relevant card. “Not only SQL databases” (aka NoSQL databases) work in that way. In addition to that, 
the data does not have to be of any specific format or stored in any particular order. Numerous pieces 
of digital information (often files of arbitrary type) are stored under a ‘key-value’ index label 
(identifying a unique information file), in an almost infinitely scalable database (Sadalage and Fowler, 
2013). 
For this work, a particular type of NoSQL database is used: a graph database in which a graph overlays 
the data to create connections. The fundamental units of a graph database are nodes and edges. 
Unique labels identify the type and content of the nodes and edges (e.g., Signal, Train). In this way, it 
is possible to develop flexible data models that support data demands in complex domains such as 
medicine, biology, chemistry and social networking (Angles et al., 2013; Jouili and Vansteenberghe, 
2013). Moreover, graph databases provide visual interfaces that enable users to perceive their data 
whilst they are performing their data analysis. Graphs enhance discovery from data which is useful for 
analysis (Figueres-Esteban et al., 2016a; Figueres-Esteban et al., 2016b; Miller, 2013). For safety 
analysis, graph databases provide a flexible platform in the sense that the analyst can introduce 
additional data for his/her risk problem, even if it is of a different type (numeric, visual or text). This 
paper explains how the technology is adopted for SPADs. 
 Method 
The modeling approach comprises of four steps that are described successively in the following 
paragraphs. Three different data sources are used for the SPAD safety data model; viz. TD data, OTDR 
data and signaling location data. The Neo4J software was used to store, manage and query the data. 
R software was used to automate the data upload and post-process the results. The method is 
described in details below. 
3.1 Safety Data model 
The first step is the development of a safety data model. Four key steps were used to construct the 
safety model, viz. the problem formulation, the identification of data points (which are represented 
as nodes), the identification of relationships between the nodes (the edges) and the required 
indicators. Figure 1 shows the four elements of the safety data model for this particular investigation; 
they are described in some more detail below. 
The first part in the development of the safety data model is the problem formulation. For this paper, 
it was derived from a narrowly defined research question: 
 Which train service stopped at a red aspect and/or had a SPAD? 
 
This informs the second part, the definition and content of relevant data points that are required for 
the data model:  
 Service node; defined as the complete service from origin to destination (including data about 
driver number, vehicle number, and start-time).  
 Service-instance node; defined as a single data-row in the OTDR file (including data about 
time, location and speed, amongst others)  
 Signal node; defined as signal as found in the TD feed (including data about signal ID and 
location), 
 Red aspect node; defined by a red-aspect approach algorithm (including data about signal ID, 
starting time and ending time) 
These nodes were created in the graph database by Cypher queries, as shown in Table 1.  
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The relations make up the third part. The relations are represented by edges in the graph. In the case 
presented in this paper, three relations were relevant:  
 The relationship between the service node and service-instance node, 
 The relationship between the signal node and red aspect node, and 
 The relationship between service-instance node and the red aspect node.  
These edges were created by queries, as shown in Table 1.  
The safety indicators represent the final part of the data model. They are queries that filter the 
database to provide insight into the research question from step 1. In this investigation, the following 
safety indicators were used: 
 Number of SPADs per signal;  
 Number of red aspects approached by a service. 
The indicators are extracted by queries; examples are given in Section 3.4.  
 
Problem formulation 
 
 
 
 
Nodes identification 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Relationships 
identification 
Service had Service instance stopped_ at Signal had Red Aspect 
Service had Service-instance passed_ at danger Signal had Red Aspect 
Safety Indicators 
SPADs per signal  
Stopped at red aspect per service 
Figure 1: Four steps of a safety data model. 
3.2 Data sources 
The identification of data sources, the second step in this method, and the design of the safety data 
model typically take place at the same time. However, there is a danger in first identifying data and 
formulating a research question later; it can lead to research bias in the sense that relevant research 
questions might be adjusted or simplified to match the data. In this work, both steps were performed 
Which Service had Service instance stopped_ at/ passed_ 
at_danger Signal had Red Aspect  
Service 
Instance 
Service  Signal  
Red 
Aspect  
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simultaneously. Due to data-sensitivity, this investigation used synthetic data replicated from three 
data sources: OTDR (On Train Data Recorder), TD-data (Train Describer) and Signal location data. The 
use of artificial data also adds to the clarity of this paper as significant efforts for data-parsing and 
cleansing pose distractions for explaining the development of a safety data model. The case study 
treats a small section of railway covering four signals and four services running along the signals. The 
data included four services, 3B01, 3B02, 3B03 and 3B04, and four signals named WP1, WP2, WP3, and 
WP4. Time, speed, and location were simulated for each service, whereas location and red aspect time 
were given per signal.  
3.3 Data handling 
Data handling, the third step, builds the actual safety model based on datasets in the database. Table 
1 illustrates the creation of nodes and relations using Cypher language for queries. Cypher is 
considered as a declarative query language as it focuses on the aspects of the result rather than on 
methods to obtain the result. Examples are given in Table 1 (for more details about Cypher see 
Panzarino, 2014)). 
Table 1: Cypher Query Examples. 
Query database instance 
CREATE(n:ServiceInstance {name: '3B04-
2694', 
             time:2694, 
             location:21669.14, 
             speed:21.26, 
             type: 'Service_Instance'}) 
RETURN n 
name 3B04-2694 
time 2694 
location 21669.14 
speed 21.26 
type Service_Instance 
 
 
CREATE (signal:SIGNAL{name: 
'WP1',type:'SIGNAL'}) 
name WP1 
type SIGNAL 
 
 
CREATE (redAspect:Red_Aspect{name: '800-
1010', 
Signal: 'WP1', 
startTime: 800, endTime: 1010, 
signalLocation:3700,type: 'Red_Aspect'}) 
 
 
 
 
signalLocation 3700 
name 
signal 
800-1010 
WP1 
startTime 800 
endTime 1010 
type Red_Aspect 
 
 
MATCH (n: SIGNAL {name: 'WP1'}),  
              (m : Red_Aspect { signal: “WP1” }) 
MERGE (n) [rel:HAD_STOP_ASPECT_AT]->(m) 
RETURN n, m 
 
 
 
 
3B04-2694 
800-1010 
WP1 
HAD_STOP_ASPECT_AT 
WP1 800-1010 
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3.4 Data analysis  
The last step is the data analysis to identify the safety indicators in the data. The relationships are 
identified by identifying data nodes where several conditions are met simultaneously. The 
relationships were identified based on the synchronization between the OTMR, TD feed and signal 
data. The conditions presented in Table 2 were coded in Cypher in a similar way as in Table 1. 
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Table 2: Relations for indicators.  
 
where: 
𝑡1 is the timestamp (in seconds) of the last service instance in front of a particular signal location, 
𝑡2 is the timestamp (in seconds) of the first service instance behind a particular signal location, 
𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 is the start time; the second that the particular signal changes to a red aspect,  
𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑 is the end time; the second that the particular signal clears from a red aspect. 
 
 
Relation Conditions that identify the Relation 
SPAD 
 
(Indicator 1: SPADs per signal) 
Service-instance location(t1)>Signal had a red aspect (tstart,tend) location<Service-instance location(t2 ) 
Service-instance speed(t1 ) >0 
tstart<t1<tend 
t2<tend 
Service-instance stopped at a red aspect 
 
(Indicator 2: Stopped at red aspect per 
service) 
Service-instance location(t1) > Signal had a red aspect (tstart,tend) location < Service-instance location(t2 ) 
Service-instance speed(t1 ) = 0 
tstart<t1<tend 
t2>tend 
services-instance approaching a red aspect  
 
(Indicator 2: Stopped at red aspect per 
service) 
Service-instance location(t1)>Signal had a red aspect (tstart,tend) location<Service-instance location(t2 ) 
Service-instance speed(t1 ) >0 
t1>tend 
t2>tend 
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 Results  
Table 3 summarizes SPAD events for signals. The red aspect start time, end time (in seconds relative to 
the starting time of the train service), the service, and its travel speed at SPAD are given in Table 3. The 
three signals that had SPADs were investigated further to check how many services had to stop by these 
three signals. It should be noted that the data used to illustrate the method is simulated data where SPAD 
had occurred due to simulated over speed profile; in reality, SPADs tend to be rare events. 
Table 3: SPAD per signal.  
Signal  Signal at Red Time of SPAD 
 
t2 (s) 
Travel speed at 
SPAD  
(m/s) 
Train Service 
(Journey 
number) 
Start time 
tstart (s) 
End time 
tend (s) 
WP1  800  1010  898  16 3B03 
WP3  1932  2059  2013  1 3B04 
WP4  1243  1550  1469  21 3B01 
WP4  1942  2093  2055  21 3B03 
 
The analysis was also carried out at the service level, Table 4 presents all information related to Service 
3B01, i.e. the service had stopped twice and had one SPAD.  
Table 4: Stopped/SPAD at red aspect per service for 3B01. 
Signal  Signal at Red Time of SPAD 
 
t2 (s) 
Travel speed at 
SPAD  
(m/s) 
Train service 
Status at signal 
 
Start time 
tstart (s) 
End time 
tend (s) 
WP1 0 230 209 0 Stopped 
WP2 551 799 774 0 Stopped 
WP4 1243 1550 1469 21 SPAD 
 
 Analysis and discussion 
The technique proposed in this paper demonstrates a hands-on safety data modeling problem. It shows 
that it is technically feasible to combine operational data from different sources to identify safety issues. 
The case study demonstrates not only which signals and services have had SPADs but also how many red 
aspect approaches a single service encounters and at what speed red aspects are approached or passed. 
 9 
The techniques allows better insight in SPADs and helps the decision makers develop safety indicators to 
monitor and investigate the link between near-SPADs and actual SPADs.  
The graph database easily facilitates extensions of the analysis to include the braking behavior of the train 
whilst it had a SPAD and the distance to signal where it stopped before a red aspect by extending the 
query. Table 5 shows just how flexible the graph approach is: straightforward analytics can be added to 
the data model to estimate distances to stop based on data that is already in the database. Table 5 gives 
an example where three services were could stop safely using the emergency brake far away from the 
signal.This provides the basis for an automated safety indicator for SPADs without the need for an in-
depth investigation by experts which, potentially, could be completely automated. The traveled speed of 
Service 3B02 was significantly higher than the other two services, which means it would score higher on 
a risk scale.  
It should be noted that the safety margin needed may be affected by the track conditions such as low 
adhesive condition. The simulated data used in this study did not consider the variations in the track 
conditions that may lead to different scenarios such as low adhesive conditions. A number of braking 
behavior simulations such as the one developed by Meli et al. (2014) and Pugi et al. (2013) could be used 
to take into account the impact of track condition on the safety margin. Another approach is to ‘train’ the 
data-model with recorded, real-life approaches to that same signal.  
 
Table 5: Additional analysis on signal cleared prior to a service approach. 
Signal 
Signal at Red Train 
Service 
(Journey 
number) 
Travel 
speed 
(m/s) 
Stop 
distance 
between train 
and signal 
(m) 
Emergency 
braking 
distance 
@12%g 
(m) 
Safety 
margin 
(m) 
Start time 
tstart (s) 
End time 
tend (s) 
WP3 790 986 3B01 11 195 46 149 
WP3 1011 1286 3B02 22 254 202 52 
WP3 1498 1563 3B03 12 241 57 184 
 
 
Using the safety data model approach with graph databases, it is relatively straightforward to extend the 
analysis to incorporate the effects of factors such as weather conditions, wheel adhesion, and service 
disruption to assess the safety state and safety indicators. If additional data is required, the four steps for 
the safety data model simply have to be repeated to identify additional research questions, nodes, 
relationships and indicators. The technique described in this paper lends itself to be indefinitely scaled to 
include additional research questions. The graph database adds the flexibility to deal with these multiple 
research questions, and additional data sources. In that way, this technique paves the way toward 
achieving one of the aspirations of safety management: proactive safety interventions that can be 
demonstrated to have reduced risk even before any accidents occur.  
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A particular application area for this technique is with the signal overrun risk assessment tool (SORAT) 
that assesses the SPAD risk at signals. The UK Network Rail has a rolling five-year program whereby all 
signals have their SPAD risk assessed. Some are looked at in more detail, but it is a largely manual process 
of entering data and running it through a model.  The advantage that the approach described in this paper 
offers is the opportunity to automate some of this analysis and introduce new metrics that can better aid 
the understanding of SPAD risk at signals and their underlying causes. Furthermore, the approach 
described in this paper provides an opportunity to identify underlying causal factors that may otherwise 
not be detected. 
 Conclusion 
This paper demonstrates a Big Data modeling approach for safety based on graph databases. It addresses 
SPAD risk as a case study. The key is a consistent approach to building a safety data model integrating 
multiple sources of data. This paper offers a straightforward method to provide such consistency.  
The results in the case study are limited in the number of data sources used, and in the safety information 
that has been provided. However, the technique demonstrates the basis that can be extended for 
additional data sources, and to uncover additional factors that may affect SPAD risk on the railway. From 
the exercises in the case study we infer that SPAD risk can be understood in new ways by the application 
of new data sources, for example the method can provide a new understanding of human factors and 
driver behavior that affect the risk. Hypothetically further data sources such as localized weather 
conditions including sun angle, or even factors such as timetable data and train on-time running data 
could be included to broaden our understanding. Such new sources of data provide the ability to analyze 
the complexities of SPAD risk to be understood in ways that have not previously been possible. 
In more general terms, the flexibility embedding a safety data model in a graph database makes it useful 
in practically every safety and risk domain. Considering the potential for scaling graph databases to 
extremely large data sets, and developing complex queries, it is not yet clear what limits there are to 
extending the approach. 
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